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I. INTRODUCTION
A presumption is a rule of law that requires that the existence of
a fact, the presumed fact, be taken as established when certain other
facts, the basic facts, are established.' Upon proof of the basic facts
giving rise to the presumption, the presumed fact must be taken as
established unless and until it is rebutted. 2 The basic fact of a pre-
sumption may be established in an action by judicial notice, by the
pleadings, by stipulation of the parties, by evidence that requires a
directed verdict, or by the finding of the trier on sufficient evidence.3
A presumption should be distinguished from an inference, which
is a conclusion drawn through logic and reasoning after having con-
sidered the facts presented.4 An inference does not compel the
factfinder to come to the conclusion as a matter of law.5 Instead, the
factfinder has the discretion to draw a conclusion because of the com-
pelling nature of the particular factual circumstances.6 Unlike an
inference, a presumption expresses a legally recognized relationship
1. If the elements of the crime charged are A, B and C, from the prosecution's proof of A
and B (the basic facts), C (the ultimate fact) is inferred. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON
EVIDENCE § 346, at 988 (3d ed. 1984).
2. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).
3. J. WEINSTEIN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE 27 (5th ed.
1976).
4. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 343, at 968.
5. Bray v. United States, 306 F.2d 743, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
6. M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 301.7, at 108 (2d ed. 1986).
1009
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1009
between facts.7 A presumption is an inference that the law directs the
trier of fact to find if a given set of facts is established.
In civil cases, the party bringing the action normally has the bur-
den of pleading,9 the burden of production of a particular matter,
10
and the burden of persuading the trier of fact of its existence." This
Comment is mainly concerned with the burdens of production and
persuasion.
The burden of producing evidence in a civil case is "satisfied by
evidence which, when viewed in the aspect most favorable to the bur-
dened party, is sufficient to enable the trier of fact reasonably to find
the issue for him."' 12 A prima facie case is established when the bur-
den of production is satisfied for each element of the plaintiff's cause
of action. The court must dismiss the case as a matter of law if the
plaintiff fails to meet this burden of producing evidence.' 3
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the trier of fact
may, but is not required to, find in his favor."4 The defendant is enti-
tled but not required to produce contrary evidence.' 5 A defendant
who produces no contrary evidence as to an element of the claim,
however, may find the court ruling against him as a matter of law if a
reasonable jury would find that the plaintiff had satisfied his burden of
persuasion as to that element.' 6 Although the burden of production
may shift from one party to the other, the burden of persuasion may
not.'7 "In the usual civil case, satisfaction of the burden of persuasion
requires that the trier of fact find that the existence of the proposition
7. Id., § 301.6, at 105.
8. Bray, 306 F.2d at 747.
9. M. GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 301.3, at 96.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. C. MCCORMICK. supra note 1, § 338, at 954-55.
13. United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 242 (2d Cir. 1972) (Before submitting case to
the jury, the judge must determine whether the proponent has adduced evidence sufficient to
warrant a verdict in his favor.).
14. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1963) (The establishment of a prima facie
case permits, but does not require, a finding in favor of the party making out such a case.). This
decision depends upon the strength of the evidence produced by the burdened party. M.
GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 301.4, at 97. The defendant is not required to produce contrary
evidence. Id. § 301.4, at 97-98. When, however, enough evidence is produced that would
require a reasonable jury to find that the plaintiff has satisfied his burden of persuasion, it is
necessary for the defendant to produce contrary evidence in order to avoid a directed verdict.
Id. § 301.4, at 98.
15. M. GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 301.4, at 98.
16. Id.
17. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1,
§ 336, at 947.
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to be proved is more probably true than not true."18
Federal Rule of Evidence 301 states that in all civil proceedings,
presumptions shift the burden of producing evidence upon the party
against whom the presumption is directed.19 This Rule, however,
does not shift the burden of persuasion upon the party against whom
it is directed. When the basic fact that gives rise to the presumption is
established, the burden of producing evidence shifts to the opponent,
who must then produce sufficient evidence to rebut the presumed
fact.20 If the opponent fails to produce sufficient evidence, the court
will either instruct the jury to find in favor of the presumed fact or it
will direct a verdict on the issue.21 If sufficient evidence is introduced,
the presumption is rebutted and then has no further use in the trial.22
This rule adopts the Thayer "bursting-bubble" theory,23 as opposed to
the Morgan theory of presumptions. 2' According to Thayer's theory,
a presumption shifts only the burden of producing enough evidence to
rebut the presumed fact. Once that evidence is produced the pre-
sumption is overcome or disappears. Any inference, though, that
exists between the basic and presumed fact, remains.25 Under the
Morgan approach to presumptions, when the proponent establishes
the basic fact, the court instructs the jury that it must find the pre-
sumed fact unless and until the opponent persuades the jury that the
nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probably true than not.26
In other words, the Morgan approach shifts both the burden of pro-
duction and the burden of persuasion to the opposing party.
In criminal cases, an indictment must set forth all elements of the
crime. The prosecution must prove each element of the crime
18. M. GRAHAM supra note 6, § 301.5, at 99-100.
19. Rule 301 provides that:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by
these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of
going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party
the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the
trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
FED. R. EvID. 301.
20. M. GRAHAM supra note 6, § 301.1, at 94.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (applying Thayer's
theory).
24. Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L.
REV. 59 (1933).
25. Legille v. Dann, 544 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Facts giving rise to the presumption
would still have evidentiary force.); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 344, at 975 (criticizing the
"bursting bubble" theory as according presumptions too "slight and evanescent" an effect).
26. Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV.
909, 913 (1937).
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charged beyond a reasonable doubt.27 Usually, the defendant's only
burden is to produce sufficient evidence of certain defenses that he
wishes to raise in the case.28  The defendant's burden of producing
evidence in such cases is slight, and is described in the Model Penal
Code as evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.29 Courts,
however, have imposed a greater burden of proof on the defendant to
establish an affirmative defense.30 When sufficient evidence has been
introduced in support of an affirmative defense, the issue is introduced
into the case and the government must then prove the contrary
beyond a reasonable doubt.3
In criminal cases, a presumption usually acts as a rule permitting
the inference of one fact from proof of another.32 As an example,
assume a crime contains three elements, A, B and C. A rule of law
provides that fact C may be inferred from proof of A and B.3 3 Under
these circumstances, the court will instruct the jury that it may, but is
not required to, infer the existence of the presumed fact from proof of
the basic facts. 34 Such a presumption, however, is not really a pre-
sumption at all. 3' Rather, it is an inference because it is permissive
and not mandatory.36 The purpose of such permissive presumptions
is to point out to the jury a natural inference that it might otherwise
be unlikely to note.37
The Supreme Court created the distinction between permissive
27. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
28. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
29. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 1.12 comment 3 (1985).
30. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S.
82, 88-90 (1934).
31. M. GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 303.2, at 129-30.
32. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 346, at 988.
33. Id.
34. The instruction is permissive because in criminal cases there can be no compelled
finding of the presumed fact. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979).
35. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
36. The words presumption and inference are often used interchangeably in cases and
literature when, in fact, their meanings differ. An inference is a logical conclusion flowing
from a set of facts from which a jury may make a conclusion and which may become a
presumption if the law requires the jury to draw the conclusion absent a rebuttal. See
Graham, Presumptions: More Than You Ever Wanted to Know and Yet Were Too Disinterested
to Ask, 17 CRIM. L. BULL. 431 (1981) (discussing the differences between inferences and pre-
sumptions); supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text. Compare Tot v. United States, 319 U.S.
463, 464 (1943) (Possession of a firearm by a person is presumptive evidence that such a
firearm was shipped in interstate commerce.) with Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 838-
39 (1973) (Possession of recently stolen property infers that the person in possession knew the
property had been stolen.).
37. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 168-69 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("Like certain other jury instructions, [presumptions] provide guidance for jurors'
thinking in considering the evidence laid before them.").
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and mandatory presumptions in County Court of Ulster County v.
Allen.38 State prisoners in Allen had sought a writ of habeas corpus,
contending that they had been denied due process through the appli-
cation of New York's statutory presumption that the presence of a
firearm in an automobile is evidence of illegal possession of a danger-
ous weapon by all occupants. 39 The Court upheld- the constitutional-
ity of the presumption because it was permissive and therefore did not
undermine the factfinder's responsibility at trial." Permissive pre-
sumptions, the Court said, did not shift any burden of proof, although
mandatory presumptions shifted at least the burden of producing cvi-
dence to the defendant. 4' The permissive presumption is better
termed an inference because the factfinder is not compelled to find the
presumed fact.42 Mandatory presumptions, on the other hand, do
compel the factfinder to find in favor of the presumed fact. Thus,
mandatory presumptions pose constitutional problems when used in
criminal cases because they have the effect of lessening the prosecu-
tion's burden of proof.4 3 The use of mandatory presumptions may
therefore violate a criminal defendant's due process rights because
conviction is possible absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
element constituting the crime charged. 44
This Comment begins with the history of the use of presumptions
in criminal cases, followed by a discussion of the constitutionality of
presumptions in light of the requirement that proof beyond a reason-
able doubt is necessary for a conviction. Next, the two types of pre-
sumptions are discussed: permissive and mandatory. Presumptions
are then analyzed in conjunction with the federal system's allocation
of burdens of proof. Finally, this Comment examines North Caro-
lina's approach as an example of one state's attempt to deal with
mandatory presumptions.
It is the purpose of this Comment to demonstrate that
mandatory presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion in crimi-
nal cases are unconstitutional, and in reality, do not exist. It also is
shown that mandatory presumptions that shift only the burden of
production serve no useful purpose. In sum, it is proposed that in
38. Id.
39. Id. at 143-46.
40. Id. at 157.
41. Id. at 157-60.
42. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
43. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157.
44. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); see also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 509,
517 (1979) (The presumption that "a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary acts" violates the fourteenth amendment's requirement that the state prove every
element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.).
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light of the federal system's allocation of the burden of proof, and the
effect of mandatory presumptions on state courts, mandatory criminal
presumptions have created unnecessary confusion in the courts. Fur-
thermore, mandatory presumptions, as far as they have been used in
the past, have served no useful function and therefore should be
eliminated.
II. THE HISTORY OF PRESUMPTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES
In Tot v. United States,45 the Supreme Court of the United States
first began to require that a presumption be relevant to a particular set
of facts.46 The defendant in Tot was found to be in possession of a
loaded gun and was convicted under the Federal Firearms Act,47
which makes it unlawful for a previously convicted felon to receive
any firearm shipped in interstate commerce. Under the version of the
Act then in force, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was
presumptive evidence that the gun had been shipped in interstate
commerce.
4 8
The Supreme Court held that this presumption violated the
defendant's due process rights because there was "no rational connec-
tion between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed. '49 The
Court explained that "where the inference created [by the presump-
tion] is so strained as not to have a reasonable relation to the circum-
stances of life as we know them," 50 the presumption violates due
process. The Supreme Court applied this rational-connection test to
the facts of Tot and invalidated the presumption contained in the Fed-
eral Firearms Act, because the defendant could have acquired the gun
intrastate or prior to adoption of the statute."
Two cases decided subsequent to Tot cast additional light on the
use of the rational-connection test in protecting due process rights. In
United States v. Gainey,52 the defendant's presence at the site of a still
was sufficient to convict him of carrying on an illegal distilling busi-
ness. Applying the rational-connection test, the Court found that
Gainey's unexplained presence at a still very likely indicated some
45. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
46. Id. at 467.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1982).
48. The statute at the time stated: "Possession of a firearm or ammunition by any such
person shall be presumptive evidence that such a firearm ... was shipped or transported or
received ... by such person in violation of this Act." Tot, 319 U.S. at 467.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 468.
51. Id.
52. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
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involvement with distillation.53 In United States v. Romano,54 on the
other hand, the Court used the same test but found that Romano's
presence at an illegal still was not sufficient to support the inference,
created by the presumption, that the defendant was, in possession of
the still.5" Because a person might be present at the still site without
being guilty of possession, the connection between presence and pos-
session was too tenuous in the Court's view to support a sufficient
rational connection.56 The Romano Court relied on Tot to assess the
required degree of rational connection. The Court concluded that
there is
no rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate
fact presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the other is
arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in com-
mon experience .... [W]here the inference is so strained as not to
have a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we know
them, it is not competent for the legislature to create it as a rule
governing the procedure of courts.57
Thus, the presumption in Romano was not sufficient because the
defendant's presence at the still lacked sufficient probability to sup-
port the inference that he was engaged in a function connected with
possession.5"
The Court employed a stricter test in Leary v. United States59
and Turner v. 'United States.' Leary involved a federal criminal stat-
ute under which possession of marijuana gives rise to the presumption
that the defendant knew it had been illegally imported.6 In judging
whether the presumption was constitutional, the Court stated that it
must be "more likely than not" that one possessing marijuana also
knew that it had been illegally imported.62 The Court, after consider-
53. Id. at 66-67.
54. 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
55. Id. at 141.
56. The different results in the two cases are a consequence of the breadth of the statute
involved. The statute in Gainey created a broad presumption that covered every conceivable
act associated with distillation. By the statute in Romano, however, presence at the still site
created only the presumption of ownership of the still. Presence tells nothing of the
defendant's function at the still site and thus no natural inference arises. For a discussion of
Gainey and Romano, see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 347, at 992-93.
57. Romano, 382 U.S. at 139 (citing Tot, 319 U.S. at 467-68).
58. Romano, 382 U.S. at 143.
59. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
60. 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
61. The defendant was prosecuted under 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1956) (repealed 1970).
62. See Leary, 395 U.S. at 36 ("The upshot of Tot, Gainey, and Romano is, we think, that
a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as 'irrational' or 'arbitrary,' and hence
unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact
is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.").
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ing the history of the statute, data on drug importation contained in
the statute's legislative record, and articles and books on marijuana
published since the statute's enactment, held the statute invalid.63
Turner concerned heroin and cocaine, but the presumption in
the case was identical to that in Leary.6' The Court again reviewed
the legislative history and the data on drug importation. 65 It upheld
the statute as applied to heroin but struck it down as applied to
cocaine.66 Anyone in possession of heroin should know it had been
illegally imported, the Court said, because it is not produced domesti-
cally nor imported for any legitimate use.67 Cocaine, however, was
produced domestically for legitimate medical purposes and thus it
could not be said that it was more likely than not that one who pos-
sessed cocaine also knew that it had been illegally imported.68
III. THE REASONABLE DOUBT TEST
The Court has never decided whether the reasonable doubt test
should apply to presumptions that help establish an element of the
crime charged. Both the Leary and Turner Courts evaded the issue.69
In In re Winship,7° the Court went so far as to state that proof beyond
a reasonable doubt in a criminal case is a constitutional requirement
because "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against convic-
tion except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact neces-
sary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.""' Although
no case has answered the question of whether the reasonable doubt
test should also apply to presumptions, logic suggests that any device
63. The Court found that a significant portion of the marijuana consumed in the United
States is grown domestically, and therefore could not conclude that a majority of those who
possessed marijuana are cognizant that it was illegally imported. Leary, 395 U.S. at 52, 53.
The Court refused to address the issue of whether a presumption that establishes an
element of a crime should pass an even higher standard, such as the reasonable doubt test. Id.
at 36 n.64.
64. Turner, 396 U.S. at 403.
65. Id. at 418 n.36.
66. Id. at 419, 420.
67. Id. at 416.
68. Id. at 418.
69. The Court stated in Leary that there was no need to consider whether a criminal
presumption must also satisfy the criminal reasonable doubt standard because the statute does
not even meet the more-likely-than-not standard. 395 U.S. at 36 n.64. The Turner Court also
made reference to the reasonable doubt standard: "Whether judged by the more-likely-than-
not standard of Leary, or by the more exacting reasonable doubt standard normally applicable
in criminal cases [the statute] is valid insofar as it permits a jury to infer that heroin possessed
in this country is a smuggled drug." 396 U.S. at 416.
70. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
71. Id. at 364; see Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions and Burden of Proof in the
Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325 (1979) (discussing the burden of proof in criminal cases).
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used as the sole evidence to prove an element of a crime must meet
the reasonable doubt test. Whether an element of a crime is proved
through the use of a presumption or through other evidence, the same
standard of constitutionality should apply because both approaches
assist the prosecution in establishing its, prima facie case. Similarly, a
presumption that is not the sole proof of an element of a crime but
constitutes some evidence of the element should, together with other
independent evidence offered by the prosecution, prove the element
beyond a reasonable doubt. To hold otherwise would be to infringe
upon the defendant's right to due process.
In Mullaney v. Wilbur,72 the Supreme Court held that the burden
of proof rests upon the prosecution to prove every element of the
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.73 The case concerned the
validity of a Maine statute that required a defendant charged with
murder to prove that he acted "in the heat of passion, on sudden
provocation" in order to reduce a charge of homicide to that of man-
slaughter.74 If the defendant did not meet this requirement, then mal-
ice was to be conclusively presumed." The defendant in Wilbur
claimed that the statute denied him due process because he was
required to disprove an element of the crime charged.76 The Court
followed the rationale of Winship, and held that the use of a presump-
tion that placed the burden of disproving an element of the crime on
the defendant violated the defendant's due process rights. 7 The pre-
sumption relieved the prosecution of its burden of proving every ele-
ment of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore violated
due process.78 Winship's holding, therefore, applied to cases in which
the issue involved the degree of criminal culpability as well as guilt or
innocence. Winship's holding applied to Wilbur even though the bur-
den of proof that was shifted to the defendant, if satisfied, would not
have established innocence but only guilt of a lesser crime.
The Wilbur decision severely limits the use in criminal cases of
presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion. Nonetheless, states
may achieve virtually the same result by using the technique approved
by the Court in Patterson v. New York. 79 The New York statute in
Patterson required a conviction of murder upon proof beyond a rea-
72. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
73. Id. at 704.
74. Id. at 703 (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (1964)).
75. Id. at 687.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 701.
78. Id.
79. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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sonable doubt of intent to kill.s° If the defendant proved, however, as
an affirmative defense, that he acted under "extreme emotional distur-
bance," then the charge of murder could be reduced to manslaugh-
ter 8 ' The Court upheld the imposition of this burden of persuasion
upon the defendant. It distinguished Patterson from Wilbur on the
basis that the defendant in Patterson was not asked to disprove any
element of the state's case.82 There was no shifting of the burden to
the defendant requiring him to disprove any fact essential to the
offense. According to the Patterson Court, if a state is able to con-
struct its laws such that it removes certain elements from the defini-
tion of a crime and makes them affirmative defenses, it may legally
impose persuasion burdens on the defendant that otherwise would
have violated principles of due process.8 3
Although a state may initially allocate the burdens of production
and persuasion to the defendant through the use of affirmative
defenses, there are limitations on the state's power of allocation. 4 In
Speiser v. Randall,85 a California statute required veterans to file an
oath as a prerequisite to qualification for a tax exemption. 6 The oath
stated that the subscriber did not advocate the overthrow of the fed-
eral or state government by force, violence, or other unlawful
means.87 The Supreme Court of the United States held that enforce-
ment of the California provision through procedures that place the
burdens of proof and persuasion on the taxpayers denied them free-
dom of speech without the procedural safeguards required by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 Justice Brennan, writ-
ing for the majority, reasoned that the state may not allocate the bur-
den of proof if "in so doing it offends some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
80. Id. at 200; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1975).
81. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 200.
82. Id. at 205-06.
83. But see Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (Requiring a defendant to disprove an
element of the crime charged, rather than requiring the prosecution to prove the element, does
not violate due process as long as the defendant is not subjected to hardship or oppression.).
84. See Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934) (The burden of going forward
with the evidence at some stages of a criminal trial may be placed on the defendant only after
the state has "proved with excuse or explanation, or at least that upon a balancing of
convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the shifting of the burden will be found to
be an aid to the accuser without subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression.").
85. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
86. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 32 (Deering 1953).
87. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 515.
88. Id. at 529.
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as fundamental."8 9 Although Speiser permits, within these limits, the
allocation of the burden of proof to the defendant before trial, the
Supreme Court has also held that the burden of persuasion may not
be shifted during trial by means of a presumption. 90
IV. THE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL PRESUMPTIONS: PERMISSIVE
AND MANDATORY
In County Court of Ulster County v. Allen,91 the defendant was
convicted under a New York statute that provided that the presence
of a firearm in an automobile is presumptive evidence of its illegal
possession by all persons in the vehicle.92 The defendant claimed the
statute violated his due process rights under the fourteenth amend-
ment, arguing that the evidence, apart from the presumption, was
insufficient to sustain his conviction.93 In an opinion written by Jus-
tice Stevens, the Court distinguished between permissive and
mandatory presumptions, and declared that the ultimate test of the
validity of a criminal presumption is that it "must not undermine the
factfinder's responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the
State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt."' 94 The
Court defined permissive presumptions as follows:95
The most common evidentiary device is the entirely permissive
inference or presumption, which allows-but does not require-
the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prose-
cutor of the basic one and which places no burden of any kind on
the defendant. In that situation the basic fact may constitute
prima facie evidence of the elemental fact. When reviewing this
type of device, the Court has required the party challenging it to
demonstrate its invalidity as applied to him.... [T]his permissive
presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the infer-
ence and does not shift the burden of proof.96
89. Id. at 523 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)) (State courts are
free to regulate their own procedure unless it violates the fourteenth amendment.).
90. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979).
91. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
92. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1967).
93. Allen, 442 U.S. at 142-43.
94. Id. at 156; see Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (The prosecution must prove every element of
a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 702 n.31 (The
ultimate burden of proof remains on the prosecution, but sometimes the burden is aided by the
use of a presumption.).
95. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157. There is no prior law or decision mentioning these two types of
presumptions. Thus, the distinction appears to be based on Justice Stevens' own perception of
the evidentiary device.
96. Id. (Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is affected only if "there is no rational way the
trier could make the connection permitted by the inference."). The risk of the rational
factfinder making an erroneous factual determination is thus only present in this situation.
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Permissive presumptions thus do not violate the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment when used in criminal trials, because there
is no shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant, and the jury
may, not must, apply the presumption. To pass scrutiny under a due
process analysis, however, a permissive presumption must still evi-
dence a sufficient rational connection between the proved and pre-
sumed facts. Such a presumption is better termed an inference
because it is not required by law but the factfinder may resort to it at
the factfinder's discretion. 9
A mandatory presumption, on the other hand, is a more trouble-
some device. The Allen Court stated that a mandatory presumption
may affect not only the strength of the 'no reasonable doubt' bur-
den but also the placement of that burden; it tells the trier that he
or they must find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact, at
least unless the defendant has come forward with some evidence to
rebut the presumed connection between the two facts.98
In the case of a mandatory presumption, therefore, the factfinder
must find the presumed fact regardless of whether there is other evi-
dence presented by the prosecution to support a conviction. The
validity of a presumption is thus determined by "the presumption's
accuracy in the run of cases."99 Without discussing the criteria used
to distinguish a permissive from a mandatory presumptiont" the
Court held that the presumption contained in the New York statute
in Allen was permissive."0 ' It further held that the statute was consti-
tutional because the presumption met the test described in Leary.'02
In a footnote, the Allen Court divided mandatory presumptions
into two parts: "Presumptions that only shift the burden of produc-
tion to the defendant, returning the ultimate burden of persuasion to
the prosecution if the defendant meets his burden of production; and
presumptions that entirely shift the burden of proof to the
defendant."' '03
97. M. GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 301.7, at 108.
98. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157.
99. Id. at 159.
100. Id. at 157 (The Court did not provide the criteria that a judge should apply to
differentiate a mandatory presumption from a permissive presumption and to instruct the jury
accordingly.).
101. Id. at 160.
102. Under the Leary test, there must be a "rational connection" between the basic facts
that the prosecution proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the latter must "more likely
that not" flow from the former. 395 U.S. at 34-36. Thus, the Court held unconstitutional the
presumption in Leary that authorized the jury to infer from the defendant's possession of
marijuana that the marijuana was illegally imported because marijuana is grown in the United
States. Id.
103. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157 n.16.
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Both types of mandatory presumptions pose problems. Those
that shift the entire burden of proof (production and persuasion) to
the defendant relieve the prosecution of the ultimate burden of prov-
ing its case against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt and
therefore violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Mandatory presumptions that shift only the burden of production
leave the court in the impossible position of having to direct a verdict
against a defendant who fails to meet the imposed burden of produc-
tion. Furthermore, Allen created an additional problem by failing to
state any basis for distinguishing between the two types of mandatory
presumptions other than the cryptic statement that jury instructions
would be controlling.'
°4
Subsequent cases have dealt with presumptions but none have
stated the criteria by which courts are to determine which presump-
tions are permissive and which are mandatory. Nonetheless, they
have held unconstitutional mandatory presumptions that shift the
burden of persuasion to the defendant. In Sandstrom v. Montana, 105
the defendant had been charged with deliberate homicide, an element
of which was intent. °6 The trial court instructed the jury that "[t]he
law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary acts."' 1 7 Because a reasonable juror could have interpreted
the instruction as requiring an irrebuttable presumption or as shifting
the burden of persuasion, the Supreme Court held that the instruction
violated the fourteenth amendment's requirement that the state prove
every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 08
Therefore, jury instructions relieving the state of the burden of proof
enunciated in Winship are unconstitutional.' °9
Francis v. Franklin " ° again made clear that shifting the burden
of persuasion of an element of the crime charged is impermissible."'
Franklin was charged with malice murder and claimed lack of intent
as his sole defense." 2 The jury was instructed that "[t]he acts of a
104. Id. The Court also stated that distinguishing between the two types of presumptions
may require recourse to the particular statute and to previous cases decided under the statute.
This suggestion, too, fails to explain what specific criteria are involved in distinguishing
between the two types of presumptions.
105. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
106. Id. at 513.
107. Id. at 517.
108. Id. at 513 (The jury was neither told that the presumption could be rebutted by some
specific type of evidence nor told that it could be rebutted at all.).
109. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
110. 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
111. Id. at 314.
112. Id. at 311.
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person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product
of the person's will.""It 3 Even though the jury was told that the pre-
sumption could be rebutted, this instruction was not enough to guar-
antee due process, because "[t]he very statement that the presumption
'may be rebutted' could have indicated to a reasonable juror that the
defendant bore an affirmative burden of persuasion." 14 The Franklin
Court had the opportunity to decide the constitutionality of presump-
tions that shift the burden of production but did not do so."I5 It held
that the jury instructions in the case could be interpreted as shifting
the burden of persuasion to the defendant, in violation of the defend-
ant's due process rights, and therefore, it did not need to address the
question whether a shifting of the lesser burden of production would
also have violated the defendant's due process rights.'"6 Thus, the
constitutionality of mandatory criminal presumptions that shift the
burden of production is an open question.
V. THE BURDEN OF PROOF WITHIN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
A. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
The Model Penal Code specifies that the prosecution must prove
every element" 7 of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 8 A defend-
ant is presumed innocent absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 9
Presumptions pose problems in both of these areas. First, they may
assist the prosecution in proving its case by allowing an element of the
crime to be proven solely by the presumption without regard to the
reasonable doubt standard. Leary established that due process is sat-
113. Id.
114. Id. at 316-17.
115. Id. at 314 n.3 ("We are not required to decide in this case whether a mandatory
presumption that shifts only a burden of production to the defendant is consistent with the
Due Process Clause, and we express no opinion on that question.").
116. Id. at 325.
117. Section 1.13(9) of the Model Penal Code defines the term "element":
(i) such conduct or (ii) such attendant circumstances or (iii) such a result of
conduct as
(a) is included in the description of the forbidden conduct in the definition of
the offense; or
(b) establishes the required kind of culpability; or
(c) negatives an excuse or justification for such conduct; or
(d) negatives a defense under the statute of limitations; or
(e) establishes jurisdiction or venue.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
118. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 1.12 comment 8 (1985).
119. See, e.g., Carr v. State, 192 Miss. 152, 156, 4 So. 2d 887, 888 (1941) (The "presumption
of innocence" is not technically a presumption-an inference drawn from a fact in evidence-
it is actually an "assumption" until facts proven by the prosecution indicate the contrary.).
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isfied by the lesser standard that the presumed fact is "more likely
than not" to follow from the basic facts.12 A presumption, therefore,
that met the Leary test but not the reasonable doubt test would allow
the prosecution to prove its case without proving every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, if the prosecution may
prove an element of a crime by a presumption, then the presumption
of innocence is overcome by proof that has not been established
beyond a reasonable doubt.
B. Affirmative Defenses
Affirmative defenses, fixed by statute or case law, allocate either
a burden of persuasion or of production to the defendant before
trial.'21 Once evidence has been produced by the defendant to sup-
port the affirmative defense, 122 the prosecution has the usual burden
of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Some common
affirmative defenses include self-defense, 123 duress, 24 and entrap-
ment. 1 25 According to Patterson v. New York, 26 affirmative defenses
are not violative of the due process clause as long as they do not sim-
ply negate an element of a crime.' 27  The constitutionality of an
affirmative defense would therefore vary from state to state depending
on the state's definition of the elements of the offense. The difficulty
with this approach is that a state may shift the burden of proof to the
defendant by removing an element from the definition of a crime. 28
There are, nonetheless, constitutional limitations on the freedom of
states to allocate the burden of proof between the prosecution and the
120. Leary, 395 U.S. at 46.
121. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 346 at 987.
122. It is not clear what amount of evidence is required to support an affirmative defense so
that the burden shifts back to the prosecution to disprove it. The Model Penal Code suggests
that it is sufficient that the defendant show enough evidence to justify a reasonable doubt upon
the issue. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). McCormick
argues that a defendant is usually required to prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance
of the evidence. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 346 at 988 n.5.
123. Brown v. State, 48 Del. 427, 433, 105 A.2d 646, 650 (1954).
124. Johnson v. United States, 291 F.2d 150, 155 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 880
(1961).
125. United States v. Bailey, 505 F.2d 417, 420 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
961 (1975).
126. Patterson, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
127. Id. at 206-07.
128. For example, instead of requiring the prosecution to prove A, B, C, and D, the state
could require the prosecution to prove only A, B, and C, with the additional requirement that
only when the defendant raised the issue of the absence of D would the prosecution have to
prove D beyond a reasonable doubt.
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defendant, as illustrated by Speiser v. Randall.29 The Speiser Court
stated:
[T]he burden of going forward with the evidence at some
stages of a criminal trial may be placed on the defendant, but only
after the State has proved enough to make it just for the defendant
to be required to repel what has been proved with excuse or expla-
nation, or at least that upon a balancing of convenience or of the
opportunities for knowledge the shifting of the burden will be
found to be an aid to the accuser without subjecting the accused to
hardship or oppression. 130
The Model Penal Code states that a defense is affirmative if such
a defense is designated as affirmative by a code or statute, or if it
involves a matter plainly within the defendant's knowledge that will
excuse or justify his action. 131 Thus, shifting the burden of proof onto
the defendant passes constitutional muster if the shift is made before
trial on an independent defense that offers justification for the crime
instead of simply negating an element of the crime. Presumptions, on
the other hand, which shift the burden of production or persuasion
during trial may be unconstitutional.' 32 Therefore, if states wish to
impose upon the defendant the burden of exculpating himself by prov-
ing an element that is not an element of the prosecution's case, the
means of achieving this objective is by establishing the ground of
exculpation as an affirmative defense.
Presumptions are useful evidentiary devices when the legislative
purpose for creating the presumption is to cause something less than a
shift in the burden of proof. 33 In cases in which proof of certain basic
facts is strong evidence of the ultimate fact so that it is deemed appro-
priate to emphasize the strength of the connection, establishing a pre-
sumption is appropriate. The permissive presumption addresses this
situation because proof of the basic facts is sufficient to submit the
issue to the jury and the jury is permitted, but not required, to find the
presumed fact. '34 Thus, the permissive presumption is really an infer-
129. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). For a discussion of Speiser, see supra notes 84-90 and
accompanying text.
130. Id. at 524 (quoting Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934)).
131. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
132. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979) (stating that presumptions that shift
the burden of persuasion are unconstitutional).
133. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 1.12 comment 7 (1985).
134. Id. ; see Ashford & Rissinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal
Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165 (1969) (discussing the purpose of pre-
sumptions and how they operate); Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions and Burden of
Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325 (1979) (providing a discussion and analysis of
presumptions).
1024
PRESUMPTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES
ence that guides the jury in making a decision they might otherwise
have been less likely to make.
Mandatory presumptions that shift the burden of production
serve a different purpose. 3 They were first discussed by the Court in
Allen,' 36 and again fourteen days later in Sandstrom,'37 but their con-
stitutionality was left undecided in Franklin.3 ' In theory, the burden
of production shifts to the defendant upon presentation of the basic
facts giving rise to the presumption, and the defendant must then pro-
duce some evidence to rebut the presumption.' 39 If the defendant
produces such evidence, then the burden of persuasion beyond a rea-
sonable doubt returns to the prosecution. Because the defendant's
burden of production is minimal, the purpose of the shift is to weed
out justifications and excuses for the crime that the prosecution does
not need to overcome with evidence, and to single out those justifica-
tions and excuses that the prosecution does need to address in
presenting its case. Sandstrom explains what should, but cannot, hap-
pen if the defendant fails to provide an "excuse or justification"'" for
the crime with which he is charged:
[T]he effect of a failure to meet the production burden is signifi-
cantly different for the defendant and prosecution. When the pros-
ecution fails to meet it, a directed verdict in favor of the defense
results. Such a consequence is not possible upon a defendant's fail-
ure, however, as verdicts may not be directed against defendants in
criminal cases.
141
Therefore, presumptions or any other devices that shift the burden of
production to the defendant cannot be utilized in criminal trials.
142
This conclusion is supported by Standard 303 of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence. 143 Standard 303 establishes the standard for a court to sub-
135. Unlike permissive presumptions, the burden of proof is shifted to the defendant and
thus their effect is more than simply suggesting to the jury that greater emphasis ought to be
placed on the proven facts giving rise to a presumption.
136. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).
137. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517 (1979).
138. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 n.3 (1985).
139. What constitutes "some" evidence is not clear. The Court suggested in Allen that
some production burdens may be satisfied by any evidence. 442 U.S. at 157 n.16.
140. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(3)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
141. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 517 n.5.
142. United States v. Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977).
143. Standard 303(b) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence addresses the submission of a
presumption to the jury. It states that:
The court is not authorized to direct the jury to find a presumed fact against the
accused. If a presumed fact establishes guilt or is an element of the offense or
negatives a defense, the court may submit the question of guilt or of the existence
of the presumed fact to the jury, if, but only if, a reasonable juror on the evidence
as a whole, including the evidence of the basic facts, could find guilt or the
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mit a presumption to the jury and the type of jury instruction
required.'" According to Standard 303, the judge is never authorized
to direct the jury to find a presumed fact against the accused if that
fact reaches an element of the crime.
145
Affirmative defenses serve the same purpose as presumptions
that shift the burden of production, but without placing the court in
the position of having to direct a verdict against a criminal defendant.
In most instances, defenses that the defendant may raise are not true
affirmative defenses that place both the burden of persuasion and pro-
duction on the defendant.1 46  According to the Model Penal Code,
only evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt is necessary to sup-
port an affirmative defense.' 47 Once the defendant produces this evi-
dence, a new element is introduced that the prosecution must
disprove beyond a reasonable doubt.
If the burden of proof in criminal cases was structured as to pro-
hibit the production shifting presumption but to allow affirmative
defenses, clarity would be gained and confusion reduced. Only
defenses that the defendant raised in the case would have to be dis-
proved by the prosecution and the court would never have to confront
the problem of what it should do if the defendant fails to meet his
burden of production.
In addition to presumptions that shift the burden of production,
presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt. If the presumed fact has a lesser
effect, its existence may be submitted to the jury if the basic facts are supported
by substantial evidence, or are otherwise established, unless the evidence as a
whole negatives the existence of the presumed fact.
UNIF. R. EvID. 303(b) (1953).
Standard 303(c) addresses the instructions that are to be given to the jury regarding a
presumption:
Whenever the existence of a presumed fact against the accused is submitted to
the jury, the court shall instruct the jury that it may regard the basic facts as
sufficient evidence of the presumed fact but is not required to do so. In addition,
if the presumed fact establishes guilt or is an element of the offense or negatives a
defense, the court shall instruct the jury that its existence must, on all the evi-
dence, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
UNIF. R. EviD. 303(c) (1953).
144. Congress deleted this rule from the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence because it was
more appropriate for inclusion in the amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 1.12 comment 2 n.9 (1985).
145. UNIF. R. EVID. 303(b) (1953), reproduced supra note 141.
146. See, e.g., Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370, 374 (1st Cir. 1967) (describing evidence
needed to prove an affirmative defense as some evidence but more than a mere scintilla);
Notaro v. United States, 363 F.2d 169, 174 (9th Cir. 1966) (describing the burden of producing
evidence in order to raise an affirmative defense as evidence that "fairly" raises the issue);
Howard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1956) (describing evidence to support an
affirmative defense as slight evidence).
147. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 1.13 comment 3 (1985).
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the Allen Court discussed mandatory presumptions that shift the bur-
den of persuasion. 48 This part of the Allen decision, however,
appears to have been incorrect in light of Mullaney v. Wilbur.4 9
Under Wilbur, it is a violation of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to place the burden of persuasion on the defendant
to disprove an element of a crime. 1 0 Because a presumption shifting
the burden of persuasion does exactly what was held to be impermissi-
ble in Wilbur, such presumptions cannot be constitutional. Indeed,
Patterson v. New York, 5 ' Sandstrom v. Montana 152 and Francis v.
Franklin 153 all reaffirmed Wilbur and held that the burden of persua-
sion may not be shifted to the defendant. In addition, a mandatory
presumption that shifts the burden of persuasion suffers from the
same infirmities as a mandatory presumption that shifts the burden of
production. Neither type of presumption is really mandatory,
because the defendant's failure to satisfy the burden of production or
persuasion never results in a directed verdict against him.'54 To call
such presumptions mandatory, therefore, results in considerable
confusion.
Furthermore, the rationale behind mandatory presumptions is
difficult to justify. In theory, according to Allen, the validity of
mandatory presumptions should be analyzed through common
knowledge without regard to other evidence in the record. 5 , Because
no extraneous information is needed to judge a mandatory presump-
tion, this approach suggests that mandatory presumptions should be
very obvious so that every rational juror will find the existence of the
presumed fact upon proof of the basic facts. An example is the pre-
sumption that a 1987 Cadillac is worth at least fifty dollars. Every
rational juror will agree to such a statement so that the only effect of
the presumption is the reiteration of the obvious. Therefore, the pro-
bative value of instructing the jury that they must find the presumed
fact is minimal because any rational juror will find the presumed fact
regardless of the presumption. Furthermore, accepting presumptions
shifting the burden of persuasion in situations in which the presump-
tion is extremely strong and obvious, does nothing to assist with
drawing the line between permissible and impermissible presump-
148. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157.
149. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
150. Id. at 704.
151. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214.
152. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 524.
153. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 317-18.
154. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 516 n.5.
155. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157 n.16.
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tions. For example, it is less obvious to say that a 1987 Cadillac is
worth $5000.
Allen created the so-called mandatory presumption. In addition
to the constitutional problems discussed above, however, Allen never
indicated how a judge determines whether a presumption is
mandatory or permissive. 156 The origin of Justice Stevens' distinction
between permissive and mandatory presumptions remains uncertain.
Justice Powell's concurrence in Allen commented thus: "The Court
suggests as the touchstone for its analysis a distinction between
'mandatory' and 'permissive' presumptions. I have found no recogni-
tion in the Court's prior decisions that this distinction is important in
analyzing presumptions used in criminal cases."'
15 7
VI. AN ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH MANDATORY PRESUMPTIONS
Allen caused confusion in the area of presumptions. Instead of
having courts merely decide whether the strength of the connection
between the basic and presumed facts was strong enough, Allen
also required that the courts distinguish between permissive and
mandatory presumptions. No guidelines were given on how that dis-
tinction should be made, and no answers were provided to the due
process questions that mandatory presumptions pose. According to
Sandstrom, that part of the holding in Allen that shifts the burden of
persuasion is incorrect.'1 8  Furthermore, Franklin recognized pre-
sumptions that shift the burden of production but did not decide upon
their validity.1"9
Two North Carolina cases, Davis v. Allsbrook 160 and Rook v.
Rice,161 demonstrate the confusion that resulted from Allen, In Davis,
the defendant, charged and convicted of first-degree murder, sought a
writ of habeas corpus. The defendant challenged the jury instruc-
tions, which provided that if the prosecution proved beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant intentionally killed the victim, or the
defendant admitted that the killing was intentional, state law pre-
sumed that the defendant acted with malice. 162 The malice element of
156. The Court suggested that jury instructions would address this issue. Allen, 442 U.S. at
162. That suggestion, however, only addresses the question of how the jury would interpret
the instruction, and not how the judge should decide what type of presumption is involved and
what type of instruction to give.
157. Allen, 442 U.S. at 170 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
158. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 524.
159. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 314 n.3.
160. 778 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1985).
161. 783 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. 1986).
162. Davis, 778 F.2d at 172.
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the prosecution's case thus could, according to the Davis court, be
proved through the use of a presumption. The defendant contended
that the instruction on the presumption unconstitutionally shifted the
burden of persuasion to him, on the element of malice, in violation of
Mullaney v. Wilbur.163 The court held that only a burden of produc-
tion had been shifted to the defendant and that such a shift was con-
stitutionally permissible as long as the presumed fact was rationally
connected to a proven fact.'" The court went on to state that
whether the jury might have understood the instruction as imposing a
burden of persuasion on the defendant was irrelevant because the
defendant had failed to meet any burden of proof whatsoever.1 6 The
defendant's failure to meet the burden of production, the court said,
had taken the element of malice out of the case, thereby reducing the
number of elements the government had to prove to establish its
case. 166 If the defendant had produced some contrary evidence, then
the burden of proof would be shifted back to the prosecution, who
would have the burden of proving all the elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. In cases such as Sandstrom, the court
said, when the defendant meets his burden of production, the question
of whether proper jury instructions were given is a critical issue.
167
Where the defendant fails to meet his burden of production, it does
not matter whether the jury interpreted the instruction as shifting the
burden of production or persuasion, because the question of malice is
no longer an issue in the case.
168
In Rook, the defendant also was charged and convicted of first-
degree murder and subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus. Like
Davis, Rook allowed the element of malice to be proven by the use of
a presumption.' 69 Rook contended that the jury instructions given at
his trial shifted the burden of proof to him in violation of his due
process rights. 70 The jury instructions to which Rook objected stated
that "if the state proves to you beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant intentionally killed [the victim,] . . .then the law implies,
first, that the killing was unlawful, and secondly, that it was done
with malice."'' The court held that the jury instruction did not shift
the burden of persuasion to the defendant but did shift the burden of
163. Id.; see supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
164. Id. at 172.
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production."1 2 Relying on Davis, the court said that, "a state may
legitimately shift a burden of production on an element of the crime
to the defendant."'
173
The Davis and Rook courts' treatment of presumptions creates
several problems for North Carolina courts. First, under Davis and
Rook, they must decide how to instruct the jury on a presumption
when no contrary evidence is produced by the defendant. In such
instances, the court must decide whether the jury should be instructed
that the defendant failed to meet his burden of proof and that the
element must therefore be removed from the case. If such an instruc-
tion is given, the jury may place undue weight on the defendant's fail-
ure to produce evidence. On the other hand, the jury may treat the
defendant's failure to produce evidence as conclusively establishing
the presumption of malice.
Second, Davis and Rook indicate that the element of malice
should be entirely removed from the case if the defendant fails to meet
his burden of production. This is equivalent to making the presump-
tion of malice conclusive because the prosecution is relieved of the
burden of proving an element of the crime. Therefore, the Davis and
Rook trial courts should have instructed the juries that they were
required to find that there was malice. Instead, the Davis trial court
simply said: "If the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt or it is
admitted that the defendant intentionally killed [the victim]... with a
deadly weapon,... the law implies first that the killing was unlawful,
and second, that it was done with malice."' 74 The word "implies"
makes the instruction permissive, not conclusive, as to the element of
malice. Even if the instruction were to be conclusive, it would none-
theless be unconstitutional because it would allow the prosecution to
establish an element of its case without, as constitutionally required,
proving it beyond a reasonable doubt.175 At best, the Davis and Rook
trial courts were instructing their juries as to an inference that they
might make. Although they stated that they were removing the ele-
ment of malice from the case, the Davis and Rook trial courts were
only confusing their juries.
Third, North Carolina's treatment of presumptions does not help
the prosecution. As stated in Justice Powell's concurrence in Allen,
the purpose of presumptions is to assist the government. 176 Instead,
172. Id.
173. Id. (quoting Davis, 778 F.2d at 172
174. Davis, 778 F.2d at 172; Rook, 783 F.2d at 405.
175. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (holding that every element of the crime charged must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
176. Allen, 442 U.S. at 168 (Powell, J., concurring).
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the prosecution's case is undermined because the instructions given to
the jury introduce a new issue into the case, whether the killing was
done with malice,1 77 that otherwise would not have been there. If the
defendant does not meet the burden of production as to malice, then
the North Carolina courts hold that the issue of malice is removed
from the case. The value of a presumption in this situation is that it
eliminates an issue from the case. There is no value to a system, how-
ever, whose only purpose is to assist the government in eliminating an
element of an offense that was unnecessary at the outset. Instead, like
other jurisdictions, North Carolina courts could have placed the ini-
tial burden on the defendant to produce some evidence of an affirma-
tive defense that would show justification for the killing.
In State v. Simpson,1 78 the court stated that "[t]he state is not
required to prove malice and unlawfulness unless there is some evi-
dence of their nonexistence . ... ,"79 Therefore, only when the
defendant produces evidence of a justification for the crime should a
burden be imposed on the state to prove malice. This objective is
most efficiently and effectively handled through the use of affirmative
defenses. Only when the defendant has evidence to support a defense
is the defense introduced into the case. If no evidence is introduced to
support a defense, that defense is not an issue in the case.
The effect of the presumption of malice in Davis and Rook
imposed upon the defendant the burden of going forward with or pro-
ducing some evidence of a lawful reason for the killing, such as self-
defense and killing in the heat of passion upon sudden provocation.
1 80
These issues can better be introduced into the case through the use of
affirmative defenses. Self-defense is mentioned in the Model Penal
Code as a typical affirmative defense.1 8 1 Killing in the heat of passion
on sudden provocation has also been used as an affirmative defense in
some jurisdictions 182 Wilbur recognizes that "many states do require
the defendant to show that there is 'some evidence' indicating that he
acted in the heat of passion" before requiring the prosecution to
negate this element by proving the absence of passion beyond a rea-
177. Malice has been defined by the North Carolina courts as "not only hatred, ill will, or
spite, but that condition of mind which prompts one to take the life of another intentionally,
without just cause, excuse or justification." State v. Benson, 183 N.C. 795, 799, 111 S.E. 869,
871 (1922).
178. 303 N.C. 439, 279 S.E.2d 542 (1981).
179. Id. at 451, 279 S.E.2d at 550.
180. Id., 279 S.E.2d at 550 (explaning the effect of the presumption of malice).
181. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 1.12 comment 3 (1985).
182. People v. Seaberry, 63 Ill. App. 3d 718, 721, 380 N.E.2d 511, 514 (1978) (burden on
the defendant charged with manslaughter to introduce some evidence that he acted under the
influence of "sudden and intense passion" resulting from serious provocation).
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sonable doubt.1"3 Placing the burden of producing evidence as to
these issues upon the defendant in the first instance is the better sys-
tem. Using affirmative defenses instead of presumptions would elimi-
nate any prejudice to the defendant caused by his failure to rebut the
state's presumption. Jury confusion would also be eliminated because
no burden is shifted to the defendant. The only burden on the defend-
ant is that allocated to him when he introduces a new element, an
affirmative defense, into the case.
VII. CONCLUSION
The theoretical distinction between permissive and mandatory
presumptions, created by Allen, has resulted in much confusion and
serves no practical purpose. Given the fact that Sandstrom, Franklin
and Patterson held that the burden of persuasion may not be shifted to
the defendant on an element of a crime, that part of Allen that
referred to presumptions shifting the burden of persuasion should be
recognized as being incorrect. In addition, there has never been a case
of an actual mandatory shifting of the burden of persuasion.
Furthermore, because courts cannot direct a verdict against the
defendant in a criminal case, that part of Allen, which was left open in
Franklin, allowing the burden of production to be shifted to the
defendant, is also probably unconstitutional, although courts have not
yet ruled on the issue. Understandably, courts are fearful of
instructing juries that they must find a presumed fact. This situation
is demonstrated by the Fourth Circuit and its reluctance to give
mandatory instructions to the jury to find the presumed fact.184
Although the Davis court upheld production shifting presumptions, it
did not go so far as to give mandatory instructions to the jury, 185 sug-
gesting that the court sensed that such an instruction was wrong and
jeopardized the constitutional rights of the accused. Because
mandatory presumptions confuse the jury and jeopardize the rights of
the accused without serving any purpose that cannot be accomplished
through other evidentiary devices, such as affirmative defenses, they
should be eliminated and Allen overruled in that respect.
SHARI L. JACOBSON
183. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 701 n.28.
184. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
185. Id.
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